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COURTS-JURISDICTION OF COUNTY JUDGE:
HOMESTEAD MATTERS
INTRODUCTION
There exists in Florida today, under the Florida Constitution, statutes,
and cases that have arisen thereunder, an unsolved jurisdictional problem
to wit: Does the County Judge have any jurisdiction over homestead
property? There are constitutional provisions, statutes and cases which
have established the County Judge's jurisdiction in this area; others say
he has none. The ramifications of an open question of such import
are indeed multifold. Customarily the County Judge, in practice, is
necessarily concerned with homestead property, directly and indirectly.
Should such intercourse be deemed unconstitutional it could create havoc
with thousands of purportedly quiet titles in Florida. The circuit courts
would be swamped with cases to determine these aforementioned titles
and burdened with certain probate cases, merely on the ground that
some remote question concerning land title or homestead is involved.
Article 5, Section 11 of the Florida Constitution casts the shadow upon
the power of the County Judge by delegating sole jurisdiction to the
circuit court on matters concerning land title and boundaries, which
logically includes homestead designations. Conversely, the constitution
and statutes authorize the County Judge's jurisdiction to deal in these
matters. Which construction shall govern? Must the jurisdiction of the
County Judge fail?
As a prerequisite to approaching this problem a brief summary of
the characteristics of homestead property, generally, is in order.
HOMESTEADS
Homestead and exemption are statutory and constitutional creations1
used to protect real and personal property from forced sale for debts of
the head of the family.2 The homestead shall consist:
* . . to the extent of 160 acres of land, or the half of one
acre within the limits of any incorporated city or town, owned
by the head of a family residing in this state, together with
$1,000.00 worth of personal property, and the improvements of
the real estate, shall be exempt from forced sale under process
of any court, and the real estate shall not be alienable without
joint consent of husband and wife when that relation exists.3
1. FLA. CONST. Art, X; FLA. STAT. e. 222 (1953).
2. Clark v. Cox, 80 Fla. 63, 85 So. 173 (1920); Armour & Co. v. lHulvey, 73 Fla.
294, 74 So. 212 (1917).
3. FLA. CONST. Art. X, § I.
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A homestead is subject to mortgage 4 or alienation by deed duly executed
in a manner prescribed by law.5 The homestead may be alienated to
some of the owner's children if done in good faith, for consideration
and for no illegal purpose." Homesteads are not exempt from: taxes,
assessments, purchase money claims, expenses for improvements, or labor
performed on homestead property.7 Homesteads are not an estate in
property.8  At the death of the head of the family, leaving widow or
lineal heirs, the homestead property is governed by the statutes of
descent and distribution,9 and cannot be devised by will. 10 The widow
shall take a life estate in the homestead, with a vested remainder to
the lineal descendants in being at the time of death of the decedent."
The widow is not entitled to dower in homestead property.12
Having considered a few of the attributes of homestead, let us
examine the statutory and constitutional provisions that shed light, even
though in conflicting and complex rays, upon our jurisdictional problem.
The approach will be such that the pertinent jurisdictional facets of the
circuit court (that serve our purpose here) will be reflected; the jurisdictional
sphere of the County Judge in the contested provinces will then be set
forth so that the obvious and even the more nebulous inconsistencies and
statutory repugnancies might be detected.
CrRcurr COURT JuRIsnICTION
"The circuit courts shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction
in all cases in equity .. .and of all actions involving titles or boundaries
of real estate . . . ."Is The court has interpreted this strictly, and held
that contests between the estate and third persons as to land title can
only be decided in the circuit court.1 4  It has also been emphatically
held that County Judges have no jurisdiction in a case where boundaries
and title to land are in question. 5  In an action on an instrument that
raises a question as to title or boundary to real estate, the County Judge
should decline to proceed further in the case.' 6  Circuit courts can give
4. Fr.. CossT. Art. X, §§ I and 4.
5. Suttle v, Wold, 117 Fla. 802. 158 So. 447 (1935).
6. LA. CONST. Art. X, § 4.
7. Fi. . CONST. Art. X, §§ 1, 2, 3.
8. Johns v. Bowden, 68 fla. 32, 66 So. 155 (1914); Hinson v. Booth, 39 Fla. 333,
22 So. 687 (1897).
9. Fti. STAT. §§ 731.23, 731,27 (1951).
10. FLA. STAT. § 731.05 (1951); Shone v. Bellmore, 75 Fla. 515, 78 So. 605 (1918);
Johns v. Bowden, 68 Fla. 32, 66 So. 155 (1914).
11. FLA. STAT. § 731.27 (1951).
12. FLA. STAT. § 731.34 (1951).
13. FLA. CONST. Art. V, § 11.
14. In re Lawrence's Estate, 45 So.2d 344 (Ila. 1950).
15. Mott v. First Nat. Bank of St. Petersburg, 98 Fla. 444, 124 So. 36 (1929);
Welch, County Judge v. State ex rel. Johnson, 85 Fla. 264, 95 So. 751 (1923).
16. South Fla. Amusement & Development Co. v. Blanton, County Judge, 95 Fla.
885, 116 So. 869 (1928).
COMMENTS
relief in cases of mismanagement of estates, by administrators, executors
and trustees, particularly where probate courts cannot give adequate relief. 17
Should the parties be dissatisfied with the county court's judgment, the
circuit court has appellate jurisdiction.' 8 Disqualification of the County
Judge also vests jurisdiction in the circuit court."'
The Florida statutes have conclusively given the circuit courts equity
jurisdiction to order and decree the setting apart of homesteads and
of exemptions of personal property from forced sales?" The court in
MeMichael v. Grady2 went further and held that the circuit court
shall determine all homestead and exemption of personal property matters.
The County Judge has no jurisdiction to designate or set apart the
homestead; 22 no conduct of the parties can confer jurisdiction. It
would seem by these cases that homesteads are within the sole province
of the circuit court. In Bennett v. Bogue2 4 it was held that the circuit
courts have full and complete jurisdiction over homestead and the rights
of the parties in connection thereto. In summation, it would seem that
the County Judge is being forced further and further from homestead
jurisdiction. The court did concede that the circuit court should not
attempt to oust the jurisdiction of the County Judge as to probate
matters. 25 In the absence of some special equity, the County Judge,
not the circuit court, has original jurisdiction over the contests of wills. 26
COUNTY JUDGES JuRISDICnoN
The Constitution of Florida states:
The County Judge shall have jurisdiction of the settlement of
estates of decedents and minors, to order the sale of real estate of
decedents and minors, to take probate of wills, to grant letters
testamentary and of administration and guardianship, and to
discharge the duties usually pertaining to courts of probate. 27
In re Warner's Estate28 construed this provision giving the County
Judge a ". . . broad grant of power and clothes the probate court
with plenary power to adjudicate any matter arising in the settlement
17. Wallace v. Luxmoore, 156 Fla. 725, 24 So.2d 302 (1946); Lykes Bros. Fla. Co.
v, King, 125 Fla. 101, 169 So. 595 (1936); Opitz v. Morgan, 68 Fla, 469, 67 So. 67(1914)
18l American Surety Co. of N.Y. v. Andrews, 152 Fla. 638, 12 So.2d 599 (1943).
19. State ex. Tel. Perry v. Home, Circuit Judge, 86 Fla. 309, 98 So. 330 (1923).
20. FLA. STAT. § 222.08 (1953); Milton v. Milton, 63 Fla. 533, 58 So. 718 (1912);
Camp v. Mullen, 46 Fla. 498, 35 So. 399 (1903).
21. 34 Fla. 219, 15 So. 765 (1894).
22. Smith v. St. Petersburg Novelty Works, 94 Fla. 540, 113 So. 769 (1927).
23. Spitzer v. Branning, 135 Fla. 49, 184 So. 770 (1938).
24. 88 Fla. 109, 101 So. 206 (1924).
25. McQueen v. Forsythe, 55 So.2d 545 (Fla. 1951); Tyre v. Wright, 144 Fla. 90,
197 So. 846 (1940); Crosby v. Burleson, 142 ma. 443, 195 So. 202 (1940).
26. Robarts v. Coram, 72 Fla. 225, 72 So. 668 (1916).
27. FLA. CONST. Art. V, § 17.
28. 160 Fla. 460, 35 So.2d 296, 298 (1948); accord, Randall v. Randall, 60
F. Supp. 308 (S.D. Fla. 1944).
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of decedent's estate." The court held that granting the County Judge
jurisdiction over litigation involving the restoration of lost documents, a
matter cognizable in equity, was not a contravention of the constitution;29
it was incidental to his probate power. ""
"The County Judge shall have jurisdiction of the administration,
settlement and distribution of estates of decedents, of probate of wills . . .
and of all other matters usually pertaining to probate."3' County Judges
have jurisdiction to set aside dower. 2  In Rinehart v. Phelps'- the court
went on to reiterate, "The functions of the court are judicial, and not
merely ministerial, resting on the discretion of the judge, not only in
making the order of sale, but in executing titles." In another situation
it was decided that the County Judge could order the sale of real estate . 4
Powers incidental to probate can include the order of the County Judge
to administrate, to execute and deliver a proper deed; 5 to determine
who the distributees shall be, and the designation of the distribution.36
The court in Barfs, Judge v. State ex rel. Britt,37 stated, "The words
'involving title or boundaries to real estate' as used in Section 11, Article
5, of the constitution of the state . . . do not necessarily mean that the
Circuit Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction." In light of
decisions and dicta of this tenor, it would seem clear that the County
Judge does have an area of concurrent jurisdiction over real estate, although
these powers have been constitutionally delegated to the circuit court.
The Constitution of Florida has authorized the legislature,38 to enact
legislation necessary to enforce the homestead provisions.39 The following
statutes were enacted which have authorized the County Judge to determine
whether er not the property in question was homestead. Section 731.05
Florida Statutes states:
. . . whenever a person who is head of a family, residing in this
state and having a homestead therein, dies and leaves either a
widow or lineal descendants or both surviving him, the homestead
shall not be subject to devise but shall descend as otherwise
provided in this law for the descent of homesteads.
The courts have almost unanimously held that although the devisor died
testate, the homestead will be treated as though he died intestate.40
29. FLA. CONST. Art. V, § 11.
30. In re Niernsee's Estate, 147 Fla. 388, 2 So.2d 737 (1941).
31. FLA. S'rAT. § 732.01 (1951); Wells v. Menn, 154 Fla. 173, 17 So.2d 217
(1944); Pournelle v. Baxter, 142 Fla. 517, 195 So. 163 (1940).
3 . ohnson v. Hayes, 52 So.2d 109 (Fla. 1951).
33. 150 Fla. 382, 7 So.2d 783, 786 (1942).
34. Blanton, Judge v. State ex. rel. McMannus, 158 Fla. 667, 29 So.2d 865 (1947).
35. Mitchell v. Bogues, 142 Fla. 787, 196 So. 306 (1940).
36. Luther v. Florida Nat. Bank of Jacksonville, 155 Fla. 240, 19 So.2d 796 (1944).
37. 95 Fla. 75, 116 So. 28, 29 (1928).
38. FLA. CONST. Art. X, § 6.
39. FLA. CONST. Art. X, § 1.
40. Brickell v. Di Pietro, 145 Fla. 23, 198 So. 806 (1940); Hays v. Jones, 122
Fla. 67, 164 So. 841 (1935); Hamilton v. Morgan, 93 Fla. 311, 112 So. 80 (1927);
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Section 731.34 provides:
The homestead shall not be included in the property subject
to dower but shall descend as otherwise provided by law for descent
of homesteads.
Section 733.01 authorizes the personal representative to take
possession of the entire estate of the decedent, except the homestead.
Assuming the County Judge has no jurisdiction over homestead
matters, how can he fulfill the duties required in the probation of wills
which involve the aforementioned statutes? Of necessity, when a will
is presented to probate, and a homestead question is raised, it is the
duty of the County Judge to determine if a homestead exists in the
property devised, and to set it apart according to Section 733,0] of the
Florida Statutes.
At this point, after perusing cases, statutory and constitutional
provisions which vested the complete jurisdiction over distribution of
homestead property in the circuit court, a statute that clearly gives the
County Judge the power to distribute the homestead property crosses
our path. The conflicts and repugnancies of this nature create the
serious jurisdictional problem with which we are here confronted. Florida
Statutes Section 734.08 states:
If at any time during the course of administration it is made to
appear to the County judge by petition that the estate consists
of no more than the homestead and exempt personal property
of the decedent, or in the event that the allegations of said
petition are denied by trial of issues made, he may thereupon
direct and order the distribution of said estate among the persons
entitled to receive the same, and upon said distribution, may
thereupon enter his order relieving, releasing and discharging
the personal representative.
In Seashole v. O'Shields,' the aforementioned statute was applied to cast
upon the County Judge. the duty of distributing all exempt personal
property to the proper persons. This case, although the court quotes
the statute, makes no mention of its application to the distribution of
real propery. In Hillboro Investment Co. v. Wilcox,42 the court refused
to rule on the constitutionality of this provision. Here, the County Judge's
jurisdiction was collaterally attacked by one whose interest was not directly
affected. Neither of these cases conclusively say that the statute is
invalid; they do not say the County Judge has been divested of jurisdiction
pertaining to the designation of homestead property. The question of
the County Judge's jurisdiction over homesteads is still unsolved.
Shone v. Bellmore, 75 Flb. 515, 78 So. 605 (1918); Johns v. Bowden, 68 Fla. 32,
66 So. 155 (1914); Caro v. Caro, 45 Fla. 203, 34 So. 309 (1903); Scull v. Beatty, 27
Fla. 426,9 So. 4 (1891).
41. 139 Fla. 839, 191 So. 74 (1939).
42. 153 Fla. 9, 13 So.2d 448 (1943).
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The aforementioned statutes and cases have shown that the County
Judge has been authorized jurisdiction over homestead property. Even
though "homestead" is not title to land, the County Judge must ascertain
who owns the homestead and set it apart while acting in his capacity
as probate judge on wills involving this question. Here lies the
constitutional inconsistency. When, as in this instance, constitutional
provisions are repugnant to one another, what solutions are open for
reconciliation or repudiation of the provisions?
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS AND INTERPRETATION
In the interpretation of the constitution the court shall adhere to
substance rather than form." Rather than a strict construction being
invoked the real intention of the people should be carried out.44 Before
the court departs from the plain language of a constitutional provision,
it must be certain that the people didn't mean what they said in the
provision." ' Constitutional provisions and statutes are generally construed
by the same rules.4"
The court in State v. Dade City17 said, "Constitutional mandates
are wise in proportion to the manner in which they respond to public
welfare and should be construed to effectuate that purpose when possible."
In the question at hand, public welfare would certainly be in issue,
considering the far reaching results of a decision on this problem. The
court held in Lathan v. Hawkins, Clerk of Circuit Court48 that constitutional
and statutory provisions may be controlled by their practical effect.
Practical effect in the adjudication of the present problem should present
a very weighty factor. When general welfare is in question, constitutional
problems should be approached from a pragmatic rather than legalistic
point of view. 40 Provisions should be read in light of the former law
and the existing system.50 Considerations of convenience, due administra-
tion of justice, and sound public policy should never be controlling in
the construction of provisions, but may be of great assistance, where
uncertainty of language exists.51
The court in Board of Public Instruction v. Board of County
Commissioners,52 approached the problem of conflicting constitutional and
43. State v. Miami, 113 Fla. 280, 152 So. 6 (1934).
44. Tampa v. Tampa Shipbuilding and Engineering Co., 136 Via. 216, 186 So. 411
(9 - Jacksonville v. Glidden Co., 124 Fla. 690, 169 So, 216 (1936).
46. State aX. e1. McKay v. Keller, Tax Collector, 140 Fla. 346, 191 So. 542 (1939);
ugge v. Wamell Lumber & Veneer Co., 58 Fla. 318, 50 So. 645 (1909).
47. 157 FIla. 859, 27 So.2d 283, 285 (1946).
48. 121 Fla. 324, 163 So. 709 (1935).
49. State v. State Board of Administration, 157 Fla. 360, 25 So.2d 880 (1946).
50. Sylvester v. Tindall, Sheriff, 154 Fla. 663, 18 So.2d 892 (1944).
51. Hall v. State, 136 Fla. 644, 187 So. 398 (1939).
52. 58 Fla. 391, 50 So. 574, 576 (1909).
COMMENTS
statutory provisions by holding the latest enacted provision is the most
recent expression of the people's will, and may repeal or modify the older
inconsistent or repugnant provisions. A compromise could be made, in
the words of the court, "Where an amendment contains no express repeal
or modification of existing provisions, the old and new provisions should
stand and operate together, if it can be done without contravening the
intent of the law making power as fairly and duly expressed in later
provisions." In Neisel v. Moran, Sheriff," the Court held that the two
provisions can stand and operate together if the old doesn't contravene
the intent of the new; unless expressed there is no automatic invalidation.
Prior provisions will be modified or superseded to the extent of the
inconsistency or repugnancy.5 4  The court in State ex tel. West, v.
Butler55 stated, "A construction that nullifies a specific clause will not be
given to a constitution unless absolutely required by the context."
Concerning a provisional repugnancy, in Wilson v. Creivs,6 it was stated,
"Where there is repugnancy between a constitutional amendment and
some provision in the original, which cannot be so construed as to have
them both stand and leave a legitimate office to perform, the original
must be deemed to have been repealed by the amendment. Distinct
provisions of the constitution are repugnant to each other only when
they relate to the same subject, are adopted for the same purpose, and
cannot be enforced without later conflict." The implication of these
two cases would seem to connote that constitution interpreters are reluctant
to completely invalidate specific provisions, provided there exists a
possibility of reconciling the conflicting clauses. The nullification of a
clause would apparently represent a last resort.
CONCLUSION
The obvious repugnancy that exists can be resolved by the invalidation
of the County Judge's jurisdiction over homesteads and all questions
concerning title and boundaries to real estate. This would present a strict
adherence to Article 5, Section 11 of the Constitution. Result: Havoc.
An inconceivable load of litigation would be thrust upon the circuit court,
both in quieting the title of the estates previously adjudicated by the
County Judge and all subsequent probate cases wherein any question of
land titles or boundaries are involved.
The alternative is, as so held in some of the cases cited, to construe
the provisions as to their practical effect and allow both to stand and
53. 80 Fla. 98, 85 So. 346 (1920).
54. Advisory Opinion to the Governot, 152 Fla. 686. 12 So.2d 876 (1943).
55. 70 Fla. 102, 69 So. 771, 781 (1915).
56. 34 So.2d 114, 117 (Fa. 1948.)
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operate concurrently. The result of this construction would facilitate the
County Judge's maintaining jurisdiction over the homestead and real
property matters incidental to the efficient and speedy disposition of
estates.
Regardless of the construction applied by the court to this question,
the problem exists and presents a real threat to all homesteads and real
property handled in the course of probate proceedings by the County
Judge. This controversy must be resolved, as a malignant ambiguity of




Recently, in Florida, the functions and powers of "Le Graunde
Inqucst"-as it existed in Medieval England-have been revitalized. The
legislature has attempted to employ this old institution to solve contemporary
criminal problems.
Attention will be directed toward some of the more important
problems encountered by this functionary-which is commonly referred
to as the Grand Jury. Whether or not the Grand Jury is the proper
institution to cope with modern day exigencies will be left to the readers
determination.
In the past the Grand jury has been frequently described as a mere
rubber stamp of the district attorney, a venerable nuisance, a relic of
medievalism performing in a slow, costly, cumbersome manner.1  It
has been the belief of many writers and commentators that the Grand
Jury should have "gone out with the horse and buggy." 2  The underlying
rationale is that many innocent men have incurred irreparable injury
as a result of presentments and indictments which were based on
inadequate and inefficient investigations.
On the other hand, it has been argued in defense of the Grand
Jury System, that it operates as a democratic guarantee against unfounded
indictments. The private citizen is given the opportunity to investigate
criminal conditions. The proponents of the Grand Jury System conclude
1. Fabisinski, The Proposed Amendment of the Constitution Relating to Grand
Juries, 8 FLA. L.J. 43 (1934); Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury, 10 ORE, L. Rev.
101 (1931); Comment, 10 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 219 (1936).
2. Morse, note I supra at 345; One judge wrote:
The Crand Jury should have gone olilt with the horse and buggy.
It provides an excellent way for 23 men to get together and spend as much
time as they think the court will permit, investigating waler melon stealing
and other offenses. Sonic Grand Juries think every one must be indicted.
Other Grand Juries think no one should be indicted.
